Accommodating Consciousness: How Should we Conceptualize the Mind in a Physical Reality?
Factors that Contribute to Third Party Success in America:
A Case Study on the People’s Party of 1892 and American Independent Party of 1968
Joel Durham
Angelo State University
Abstract
Third party presidential candidates are rarely significant or successful players in
American politics. This paper explores what factors create the most amount of relative success
for third party presidential candidates as defined by winning more than five percent of the
popular vote and more than one state’s electoral votes. This is a low bar, yet only five third party
presidential campaigns have risen above it. The paper theorizes that the two major factors that
lead to third party success in presidential politics are the presence of an attractive party
platform and a charismatic candidate. The attractive platform is measured in terms of
uniqueness and relevant viability, as shown by a lack of major party support and later major
party incorporation. The charismatic candidate is measured in terms of a personal connection,
fundamental transformation, and party control, as shown by the candidate’s communication,
message, and position within the party, respectively. To test this hypothesis, the paper analyzes
two incredibly distinct cases of successful third party presidential candidacy success: James B.
Weaver of the People’s Party in the 1892 presidential election and George Wallace of the
American Independent Party in the 1968 presidential election. As expected, despite their many
differences, these successful third party campaigns are found to have two factors in common:
their attractive platform, and their charismatic candidate. This research is important because the
pattern identified can be applied to other third party candidates, and even major party
candidates, especially with further study and discussion.
Introduction
Third parties and their candidates are rarely significant players in American politics, and when they do have influence, it is usually centered in presidential elections.[1] The most successful yet irregular case of a third-party presidential campaign was the case of Roosevelt’s Bull Moose Progressive Party in 19122 and his few 88 electoral votes.[3] Most third parties, however, do not pick up the traction needed to garner any electoral votes and be of substantial note in presidential politics.[4] However, third parties can have much backstage influence on American political dialogue; third parties can push issues into political discussion and pressure major parties to pivot their political platforms.[5] The third parties that are most successful and most effectively create this pressure can be reasonably speculated to have an underlying pattern in common. The patterns that lead to the success of third parties, once identified, can be applied to larger political parties, figures, and movements. Much study has been done on the electoral college and the factors that have contributed to third party dissuasion in the United States.[6] For example, “the simple plurality electoral rule, which is used in nearly all U.S. elections, hampers the ability for third-party candidates to win many votes.”[7] While this “first past the post rule with singlemember districts” generally acts as a barrier for third parties and their candidates, an additional “petitioning requirement” that varies between states can deter potential third party candidates as well.[8] These negative factors apply to all third parties attempting to carve out their space in the political ecosystem. Instead of focusing on the nation-wide barriers for third party campaigns in presidential politics, this paper will explore what factors create the most amount of success for third party presidential campaigns.
Hypothesis and Methodology
I theorize that the two major factors that lead to third party success in presidential politics are the presence of an attractive party platform and a charismatic candidate. I will be defining the success of a third-party presidential campaign by winning more than five percent of the popular vote and more than one state’s electoral votes. This is a low bar, yet only five third party presidential campaigns have risen above it.
The characteristic of an attractive party platform is exhibited by a party that has lead policy positions that (1) are not supported by either major party, and (2) are perceived by other parties to be addressing relevant issues and suggesting viable solutions, shown by recognizable incorporation of some or all of these solutions by one or both of the major parties in the next presidential election cycle. By lead policy, I mean the central party platform planks around which the party is centered. I will measure the first facet by comparing the lead policy positions of the third party to the party platform of both the Democratic and Republican Party during the relevant election cycle. I will measure the second facet by examining later major party incorporations in the next presidential election cycle of the previously unique third party lead policy into the major party’s own platform. These later incorporations, as an attempt by major parties to diverge towards a supported, relevant and viable solution, will show the apparent relevance and validity of the solutions because they are being adopted by the major party.
The characteristic of a charismatic candidate is exhibited by a candidate who (1) creates a personal connection with his voters through direct communication, (2) calls for fundamental transformation through a major, radical change, and (3) has control over his party. I will measure the first facet of a charismatic candidate by examining the directness of the candidate’s communication to his supporters. By direct communications, I mean communication, whether written or spoken, that comes directly from the candidate himself to his potential supporters. I will measure the second facet by analyzing the messaging of the candidate to determine if it is calling for a fundamental change. By fundamental change, I mean that there is some foundational institution that the candidate is communicating that he wants to substantially alter or remove. I will measure the third facet by analyzing where the candidate stands in the party leadership and their effectiveness at personally influencing the party’s direction.
When these two factors, as defined above, are both present, I hypothesize that third parties and their candidates will receive support from voters. In summary, I hypothesize the following.
● H1: In a comparison of third party presidential campaigns, those having an attractive party platform will be more successful with voters than those without an attractive party platform.
● H2: In a comparison of third party presidential campaigns, those who are a charismatic candidate will be more successful with voters than those who are not a charismatic candidate. In order to test the hypothesis, I will use Table 1 and Table 2 to guide my findings. Each facet will be scored on a one to five point scale to create a total of a five to twenty-five point scale. This overall score is hypothesized to be associated with the characteristic of a successful third party campaign.
In order to test the hypothesis, I will use Table 1 and Table 2 to guide my findings. Each facet will be scored on a one to five point scale to create a total of a five to twenty-five point scale. This overall score is hypothesized to be associated with the characteristic of a successful third party campaign.
Two Noteworthy Cases
There are two particular successful pushes by third parties in presidential elections in the United States that I will use as case studies to test my hypothesis. These candidacies were chosen due to their shared success, despite having many differences. The first of these, during the presidential election of 1892, was James B. Weaver’s presidential campaign that won 22 electoral votes with 8.5 percent of the presidential popular vote.[9] Weaver, a politician familiar with third parties, was the candidate from the newly formed People’s Party, a populist, agrarian party.[10] The second push, during the presidential election of 1968, was the presidential campaign of George Wallace, winning 46 electoral votes with 13.5 percent of the popular vote.[11] Wallace, the former governor of Alabama, was backed by the American Independent Party (AIP), a party that grew around him.[12] The success of these parties makes them outliers from most of their fellow third-party presidential candidates,[13] and they clear the bar of success, which deems them to be cases worth studying. Due to the seventy years that separated them, there are several differences distinguishing these campaigns, their platforms, and their candidates. However, by examining the factors that these cases have in common, the pattern that grants a third party success can be discovered. I will study the cases of the People’s Party’s and the American Independent Party’s respective platforms and determine if they have an attractive platform and I will determine if James Weaver and George Wallace have sufficient evidence to be deemed charismatic leaders based on my hypothesis and proposed methodology
Exploring a Potentially Attractive Platform
The first factor that will be examined in the exploration of maximum third party success in presidential politics is the presence of a potentially attractive platform. Platforms are based on the two general yet distinct types of problems that a voter can face and seek a resolution for. The first, economic attitudes, is usually measured on a traditional unidimensional scale.[18] This unidimensional scale is typically measured in terms of economic liberal and economic conservative, however, since the introduction of many social issues into the American political discussion during the civil rights era, there has been an additional dimension added to the interpretation of American political attitudes.[19] This has led to a multidimensional study of ideology that has discovered that “a conventional unidimensional spectrum” has masked several types of political moderates into a singular amorphous group. [20] Some of these moderates may simply have a low interest in politics and thus a low turnout rate, while others might simply “weigh economic issues over social issues in choosing a candidate.” [21] A multidimensional understanding of American politics is crucial to an understanding of third party politics because many of these voters consider themselves to be moderate because they are not tied to a particular party, but instead to a particular economic or social issue. [22] With this in mind, the two cases that this paper will be examining were each motivated by distinct types of issues. For Weaver’s People’s Party in the lead-up to the presidential election of 1892, an economic issue was the fundamental foundation of the party’s platform, while Wallace’s American Independent Party during the presidential election of 1968 primarily focused on social issues as a platform to attract voters.
Theory of How Potentially Attractive Third Party Platforms Can Increase Voter Support
The necessary conditions for the creation of a political party do not necessarily contribute to its success. In a Downsian model of a two-party elections, the two candidates’ platforms can be expected to converge in a unidimensional framework in order to attract the greatest number of voters. [23] Because of this expected convergence without a third party, voters, especially those who weigh a particular issue over any other political issue, can be expected to become frustrated with their party as the parties’ platforms draw closer to one another on policy positions about issues. Third parties then step into the multidimensional political sphere, find an untouched political issue, and carve out for themselves a corner. This process relies on political convergence and the sense of major party breakdown. According to Lee, “the mere threat of third party entry induces major party candidate divergence”.[24] When a third party threatens to take support away from a major-party, the platforms of the candidates diverge away from one another to recover any lost ground and in order to avoid being outflanked. These political trends can be applied to third party activities in presidential elections. The conditions of two converging party platforms and voter discontentment do not create success for third party platforms, rather they create the space for a third party platform to exist. Without the convergence of major-party platforms that prompts voters and leaders to look elsewhere for political solutions, a third-party has no reason to be created.[25] A factor that makes a third party successful, however, is a political platform that presents a solution that is unique from any other party and attractive to voters because of its feasibility and relevance. Those characteristics will be measured using the outline detailed in Table 1. As examples of a successful candidacy, this paper will examine the cases of Weaver’s People’s Party and Wallace’s American Independent Party and determine if they have an attractive platform.
Testing the Potentially Attractive Platform Hypothesis in the Case of the People’s Party
In the presidential election of 1892, James B. Weaver was the national candidate from the People’s Party. The People’s Party was not organized at any particular time or date but grew from an unrest among farmers in the 1880s. [26] Due to the crop-lien system, a majority of farmers were facing economic issues as there was a steady decline in commodity prices. [27] This created distrust from farmers of bankers, industrialists, and merchants and they looked to political organization as their solution. [28] After successful, local grassroots campaigns weeded out rings of local politicians in Comanche and Erath counties, [29] Texan farmers who were members of The National Farmers Alliances saw that organized political change was effective and pushed for a political party that would protect their interests. [30] The National Farmers Alliances formed a national convention for their People’s Party in July 1892 and created a platform on which they wanted to promote their presidential candidate. [31] The platform primarily focused on economic issues. They called for significant changes to the system of land ownership, [32] “government owned railroads, free coinage of silver, and a graduated income tax”.[33] These lead policy positions fully meet the first facet of the theory of a potentially attractive platform because both major parties agreed on the currency issue34 and the People’s Party had a unique solution to the problem.35 Both major party campaigns and strategies focused on the tariff, while the People’s Party offered different economic solutions.[36] Additionally, the viability was historically established when the Democratic Party changed their position in the following presidential election in 1896.[37] Although this new Democratic platform was a break from the past by adding “a few Populist planks, particularly the free silver stand” to “seduce the third party”, “the Republicans barely budged” on the economic issue.[38] Historically, it is impossible to tell whether William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic candidate, intended to fulfill the fusion platform after his potential win in 1896, [39] but by adopting platform planks, the Democratic Party gave credibility to the People’s Party’s platform. The People’s Party had a fully unique platform because neither party had similar lead policies in the presidential election of 1892, scoring a five out of five for no major party support. The People’s Party is shown to have a somewhat relevant and viable platform by the later incorporation of the party’s lead policies, especially free silver, in the next presidential election by only the Democratic Party, scoring a four out of five for major party incorporation attempt in the next presidential election. Overall, the People’s Party platform is scored as a nine out of ten for a potentially attractive platform as shown in Table 3.
The attractiveness of the People’s Party’s platform faltered when, after the unexpected success of Populist candidates across the country, the Democratic Party shifted their platform to give the People’s Party less space in the political environment. In the next presidential election, the Democratic Party nominated William Jennings Bryan and endorsed free silver, effectively removing the uniqueness of the People’s Party platform. “The 1896 election marked the first time that the major parties had taken opposing stands on the currency issue”.[40] Voters flocked back to the Democratic Party and the People’s Party itself endorsed William Jennings Bryan. [41] The Texas delegation had no part in the nomination of the fusion ticket for the 1896 presidential election, [42] but without their unique stance on the economic issue of silver, the People’s Party effectively died on a national level and eventually got enveloped by the Democratic Party. [43] Even though the fusion ticket lost, the People’s Party lost its unique element to its platform which made the party itself seem much less feasible to effect change. Without that platform the People’s Party lost an important factor that had contributed to its relative success in the nation. If it had wanted to retain its success and momentum, the People’s Party would have had to pivot its platform to discover a new, attractive platform that met the same criteria as before. The party was so wedded to its lead policy positions in its platform that it lost relevance as it lost its uniqueness.
Testing the Potentially Attractive Platform Hypothesis in the Case of the American Independent Party
In the presidential election of 1968, the American Independent Party presented George Wallace as their national candidate. Although it is difficult to separate the American Independent Party from George Wallace as a candidate, he had a platform on which to stand for his presidential campaign. The American Independent Party focused on the social issues of “law and order” and “urban unrest” as a way to target voters who were discontented with the nation’s direction on race relations.[44] When he announced his campaign with the American Independent Party, George Wallace claimed there was not “a dime’s worth of difference” between the two major parties, especially when it came to desegregation, urban unrest and protecting property rights.[45] This claim, supported by the voters who showed their agreement by voting for him, showed that his platform’s lead policies were not supported by either major party, fully meeting this first facet of a potentially attractive platform. Essentially, Wallace had successfully “kindled the deep discontent of an embittered national political minority” [46] Additionally, Wallace’s platform was aggressively conservative on social issues, filling the gaps that Humphrey and Nixon had left while trying to appeal to a different voter base.[47] Nixon’s platform, which was closer to Wallace’s platform, was delicately balanced between Northern and Southern political, social, and racial sympathies. [48] On issues, such as civil rights, law and order, and Vietnam, Nixon and Humphrey took similar stances, with Humphrey taking a more progressive stance and Nixon taking a right-leaning moderate stance. [49] This left Wallace’s platform the ability to be unique from the other candidates with its right-leaning lead policies, [50] fully showing the first facet of the theory for a potentially attractive platform. The viability of Wallace’s platform was shown by Nixon’s political maneuvering to regain that voter base,[51] especially in the leadup to the election of 1972.[52] There was a significant impact “that George Wallace’s candidacy had on the Nixon administration’s civil rights policies,”[53] which shows that Wallace’s policies were not unviable, somewhat meeting the second facet of having a potentially attractive political platform. The Democratic Party, in contrast, could do little to move in Wallace’s political direction to pick up more votes,[54] so for that reason, only one party, the Republican Party, incorporated lead AIP policies into their platform. The American Independent Party was shown to have a fully unique party platform because neither major party had similar lead policies in the Presidential election of 1968 as they leaned away from the AIP’s controversial policy positions, scoring it a five out of five for no major party support. The somewhat relevancy and viability of the American Independent Party’s was shown by Nixon’s later incorporations of southern sentiments into his Republican Party platform in preparation for the next presidential election, scoring AIP a four out of five for just one major party incorporation attempt. Overall, the American Independent Party is scored as a nine out of ten for a potentially attractive platform as shown in Table 4.
The attractiveness of the American Independent Party platform faltered when, after winning the 1968 presidential election, President Nixon continued to intentionally take actions to draw Southern support.[55] The Republican Party tried to create a feeling that Nixon had sympathy for the South by using rhetoric aimed at likely Wallace supporters. Much of this rhetoric was created by Southern politicians that Nixon had surrounded himself with.[56] Meanwhile, the Democrat Party leaned heavily into the idea that a vote away from their candidate was a vote supporting the Republicans. They also pushed blue-collar workers, potential populist or third-party voters, to stay loyal through the unions controlled by the party.[57] The Republic Party drifted their platform to cover more of the social issues that the American Independent Party had taken advantage of in order to gain success. Because of this divergence away from a moderate position, the Republican Party, through Nixon, removed the unique and attractive platform from under the feet of the party by pivoting his own policies and strategies.
Summary of Cases and their Attractive Platforms
The case of the People’s Party and the case of the American Independent Party are different in many ways. They arose out of different political issues, different sides of the political spectrum, and from very different political figures. At this point, it is clear that they have one major factor in common. They both had attractive political platforms on which their presidential candidates stood. Both parties scored a nine out of ten for their potentially attractive platform score. They each missed a point because only one party, the party that was closest in ideology, pivoted its own platform to incorporate parts, if not all of the platform, to recover ground that had been carved away by the third party. These similarities show the first factor that is common in successful third parties.
Exploring a Potentially Charismatic Candidate
The second factor to be explored in the examination of maximum third party success in presidential politics is the presence of a potentially charismatic candidate. Political charisma as a term can be vague and misleading,[58] thus, it is important to define. For a foundational groundwork, I look to Pappas’ definition of political charisma, “a distinct type of legitimate leadership that is personal and aims at the radical transformation of an established institutional order.”[59] This definition stems from a study of modern European populist leaders and has not been replicated for third parties in the United States. While studying populism in Europe, Pappas found that truly charismatic leaders are quite rare.[60] While its existence was empirically rare, charismatic leadership was highly correlated to successful populist candidates.[61] The People’s Party and the American Independent Party are often described as populist [6263] which creates a natural bridge between the Pappas study and this one but the definition can also be built upon for all third parties, especially in America, including the populist parties. Pappas separates his definition into four distinct, measurable indicators. I will adapt and use two of his indicators, “centralized authority” and “unmediated and direct and often quite intimate relationship”[64] . Pappas does not differentiate between the radical candidate and the radical platform, which is a distinction that I will be making so I will adapt the remaining two indicators into a more concise definition and leave elements of the analysis of the platform in the sections above. With this measurable definition, I seek to explore the presence of a charismatic leader in each successful third party presidential party.
Theory of How Potentially Charismatic Candidates Can Increase Voter Support
An attractive platform alone cannot increase voter support and be a contributing factor to a third-parties success. An additional factor that makes a third party successful is a charismatic candidate that stands on the platform who is personal, calls for a fundamental transformation, and has control over his party. The personability of a charismatic leader will be measured through direct communication between the candidate himself and his followers. An uncharismatic candidate relies on the impersonal political party to gather followers, while a charismatic candidate can gather followers through their own relationship with their supporters. [65] The call for fundamental transformation by a candidate can be measured through the content of the communication of the candidate. A charismatic candidate will be calling for a major, radical change and inviting his potential followers to follow him out of an old institution that he believes should be majorly changed or removed. The change is attached to the individual candidate as much or more than it is attached to the party. An uncharismatic candidate is not calling for change and has no individual appeal to potential supporters because they have no purpose to rally behind. Additionally, a charismatic candidate will control the direction of the party to support their message. An uncharismatic candidate is unable to control the party to conform to their radical beliefs, if they have any, [66] and so they stay within the confines of their party’s potentially less radical platform. These characteristics of a potentially charismatic candidate will be measured using the outline detailed in Table 2. As examples of a successful presidential candidacy, this paper will examine the cases of Weaver of the People’s Party and Wallace of the American Independent Party and determine whether they are charismatic candidates.
Testing the Potentially Charismatic Candidate Hypothesis in the Case of James Weaver
James B. Weaver was the national candidate for the People’s Party in the presidential election of 1892. Weaver was a respected Union Civil War veteran [67] and no stranger to reform parties as he was the Greenbackers presidential nominee in 1880. [68] His former third-party involvement carried criticism from contemporaries as he was seen as part of the “‘group of third party ‘come-outers’’” and so he would have little draw for the party. [69] Nevertheless, he was still regarded as a man of balance and moderation who advocated for economic justice and appealed to Civil War veterans.70 Once nominated by the party he “embarked upon a strenuous and courageous campaign” attracting hecklers and eggs thrown in hostility. [71] The reactions he received, while negative, showed that Weaver was effectively creating a presence and directly communicating as an individual candidate to potential voters. Additionally, Weaver published a book in 1892 and his self-claimed “object in publishing this book [was] to call attention to some of the more serious evils which now disturb the repose of American society and threaten the overthrow of free institutions.” [72] I can find no source that speaks to the popularity of this book, so I cannot grade Weaver on the effectiveness of his communication, but writing a book to explain your personal reasons for running as a presidential candidate is certainly direct communication. Between his campaign rallies and this book specifically targeted at explaining his political perspectives, Weaver’s communication is considered to be fully direct. Once Weaver was nominated, there is no evidence of communication through the party to supporters. Thus, Weaver scores a five out of five for the directness of his communication.
In his book, A Call to Action, Weaver very clearly outlines the major, radical changes that he is calling for. He starts by arguing that the Senate and Supreme Court have become usurped by an “aggressive plutocracy.” [73] He finds trusts to be “in conflict with the Common Law” [74] and he calls for the government to create laws that “would destroy the Trust root and branch.” [75] He ends his call by imploring his audience to “make the year 1892 memorable for all time to come as the period when the great battle for industrial emancipation was fought.” [76] He makes all of these claims under the assumption that “the two well-organized and equipped political parties march to the assistance of each other” [77] implying that his call to action is not favorable to the major parties and that it is expected to not receive a good reaction. When voters were presented with the two major parties, who did not differ much on these issues, Weaver’s sophisticated explanation of his political perspectives served as a major, radical change that he was calling for. [78] Weaver was calling for major economic and political changes that were not usual from contemporary politicians and statesmen. Thus, Weaver in the 1892 presidential election was calling for a major, radical change, scoring him with a five out of five because he fully does call for fundamental transformation.
Weaver’s effective control over his party as the People’s Party candidate through his communication can be shown in two ways. First, the People’s Party 1892 platform remarkably resembled Weaver’s A Call to Action, published in the same year. For example, the preamble of the party platform also points blame towards the two major parties as using the battle over the tariff as a way to ignore the real issue including the trusts, and government corruption. [79] Furthermore, the party’s Expression of Sentiments cites the “plutocracy” as the force behind their issues and calls for election reform for the Senate. [80] These similarities highlight the controlling effect that Weaver had on his party. He was able to, at the very least, make an impact on his party. Secondly, Weaver’s controlling leadership is shown by his leadership in the party after the election of 1892. He showed that he was among the leadership for his party by being the largest advocate for Democrat fusion in 1896, [81] a decision that was followed. Weaver does not fully meet the criteria for control over his party because he was only one of the leaders in the party and the control of the party’s direction was not solely in him. Some of the more explicitly radical of his ideas were not perfectly reflected in the party platform. For these reasons, Weaver is scored with a four out of five for control over his party due to being among the party leadership. Overall, Weaver scored a fourteen out of fifteen as a potentially charismatic candidate as shown in Table 5
Testing the Potentially Charismatic Candidate Hypothesis in the Case of George Wallace
George Wallace was the national candidate of the American Independent Party in the presidential election of 1968. As the former governor of Alabama, Wallace was familiar with using racial and social issues as fuel for his political career. [82] He gained national recognition when he physically blocked two black students from entering the doorway to the University of Alabama in June of 1963.[83] By the time the AIP, his third-party, nominated him as their candidate, he used the rhetorical staple of “law and order” [84] but people knew he was talking about race, even if he never mentioned it.[85] While campaigning in the summer of 1968, “Wallace drew large and enthusiastic crowds” numbering in the thousands. [86] He had “blunt, often crude language” that “had no greater potential appeal” to journalists cynical of the major party candidates' attempts to look the part through controlled photo ops.[87] Wallace even directly requested funds from participants in his rallies, giving poorer voters the impression that they were contributing and had a stake in his candidacy.[88] These direct appeals and communications show that Wallace fully had created a personal connection with his voters and potential supporters. Additionally, Wallace’s rallies and meals were starkly contrasted with the “discreet, private ‘occasions’” that the major parties had become accustomed to.[89] This direct communication effectively appealed to his expected supporters. Wallace had the “backing of 20 percent of white unskilled workers” and over “17 percent of those with less than a high school diploma voted for Wallace”.[90] Additionally, the “contextual effect” influenced his voters. “That is, the greater the concentration of the blacks in a county, the greater the propensity of whites in that county to vote for a racist candidate”,[91] with George Wallace being described as a racist candidate. Wrinkle found that “the strongest relationship identified by our correlational analysis is between percent black and percent voting for Wallace” which does not mean that African American voters were voting for Wallace, just that those who lived in areas with a significant African American community were voting for him.[92] The AIP was incredibly disorganized as a party [93] which meant that there was no communication from the party that wasn’t from Wallace himself.[94] So, Wallace scores a five out of five for fully creating a personal connection through his direct communication.
The content of Wallace's message had fundamentally transformative tendencies. Although Wallace had his frustrations with both major parties, his personal political positions were not completely incompatible with the other parties, particularly the Democrat Party. As a student of Populism,95 Wallace continued to return to the Democratic Party for his primaries and his gubernatorial races. [96] Among Wallace’s pet-villains were the “back-alley muggers, urban rioters, HEW bureaucrats, federal judges, and…the ‘out-of-touch politicians’” [97] and they served as the target for his scorn and call for change. Because of the racial aspect of his position, [98] that Wallace tended to explicitly ignore, [99] his message can be seen as radical. The message however did not attack any particular institution heavily but many minor changes to established institutions, such as the control of the school system,[100] or cutting foreign aid to certain countries.[101] For those reasons, Wallace is scored with a four out of five for his fundamental transformation in his message due to many minor changes that he was calling for, meaning that he somewhat called for fundamental transformation.
Wallace left the Democratic Party because his personal political perspective was not having the effect that he wanted, so he created the American Independent Party to allow himself to have maximum control.[102] The AIP existed for Wallace and could not exist without him. After Wallace returned to the Democratic Party, the AIP candidate in the 1972 election won only 1.4 percent of the national popular vote.[103] This simple fact shows that Wallace, as the originator of the party, had the sole control over the party. Due to this, Wallace is scored with a five out of five for control over the party because he fully decided the party direction. Overall, Wallace scored a fourteen out of fifteen as a potentially charismatic candidate as shown in Table 6.
Conclusion and Implications
The case of Weaver’s People’s Party and Wallace’s AIP have many major differences in their origin, organization, and focus. However, these two cases have three things in common. Their success, their attractive platform, and their charismatic candidate. James B. Weaver and the People’s Party, scored a twenty-three out of twenty-five showing their potential attractive platform and charismatic candidate as shown in Table 3 and Table 5. George Wallace and the American Independent Party, scored a twenty-three out of twenty-five showing their potential attractive platform and charismatic candidate as shown in Table 4 and Table 6. These discoveries show that Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are supported. When both of these factors, an attractive platform and a charismatic candidate, are present then third party success is to be expected based on these findings.
A third party without an attractive platform or a charismatic candidate is to be expected to fail. There are many examples of failed third party presidential candidates. It would be interesting to see how those candidates and their platforms score using this scoring guide. That study would further prove or disprove the hypothesis of this study. Additionally, it would be interesting to compare those cases with the expectation of “major party failure” to determine if “major party failure” remains consistent while the potential attraction and charisma are variable. For example, the 1948 Dixiecrat party could be analyzed under this same criteria and potentially shed light on other important facets. More American political study should be done using the charisma framework that Pappas proposes, even in major parties. His empirical tools could be used to discover where some political success is coming from. For example, Donald Trump of the 2016 and 2020 Republican Party may be able to attribute some of his unexpected success to the simple factor of the potential attraction of his platform and potential charisma of himself as an individual. That study could shed light on the importance of a major party candidate attaining apparent control of the party in order to show their charisma, to lead to more voter interest or the importance of so many rallies with the candidate himself giving speeches to potential voters.
The greatest limitation of data that I encountered was the issue of the lack of information surrounding Weaver’s 1892 candidacy. For example, I would have liked to know if his book, A Call to Action was widely read, even among his own supporters. Much of Wallace’s campaign has been detailed, however the literature surrounding him as a figure and presidential candidate varied on their bias towards him.
Footnotes & Bibliography
1 Daniel J. Lee, “Anticipating Entry: Major Party Positioning and Third Party Threat.” Political Research Quarterly 65, no. 1 (2012): 138–50. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23209565, 138.
2 Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus. Third parties in America (Princeton University Press, 1984), 4.
3 Ibid., 86.
4 Lee, “Anticipating Entry”, 146.
5 Ibid. 6 Daniel J. Lee, “Take the Good with the Bad: Cross-Cutting Effects of Ballot Access Requirements on Third-Party Electoral Success,” American Politics Research 40, no. 2 (2011): 268, https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x11414118. 7 Ibid., 268.
8 Lee, “Anticipating Entry,” 140.
9 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 231.
10 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 71.
11 Ibid., 234.
12 Ibid., 111.
13 Ibid., 231.
14 Ibid., 215.
15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., 216.
17 Ibid., 215.
18 Klar, Samara. “A Multidimensional Study Of Ideological Preferences And Priorities Among The American Public,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 78 (2014): 345, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24545954.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 354.
21 Ibid., 355.
22 Ibid.
23 Lee, “Anticipating Entry,” 139.
24 Ibid., 146
25 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 214.
26 Roscoe Coleman Martin, The People’s Party in Texas: A Study in Third Party Politics, (1933), 30.
27 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 69.
28 Ibid.
29 Martin, The People’s Party in Texas, 31.
30 Ibid., 34.
31 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 71.
32 Martin, The People’s Party in Texas, 48.
33 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 71.
34 Ibid., 74.
35 Bensel, Richard Franklin. The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900 (New York, NY: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000), 240.
36 Ibid.
37 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 74.
38 Bensel, The Political Economy., 253.
39 Ibid.., 254.
40 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 74.
41 Ibid.
42 Martin, The People’s Party in Texas, 241.
43 Ibid., 242.
44 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 110.
45 Ibid., 111.
46 Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics. 2nd. ed. (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 370.
47 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 132.
48 Carter, The Politics of Rage, 327.
49 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 131.
50 Ibid., 132.
51 Ibid., 111.
52 Carter, The Politics of Rage, 423.
53 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 222.
54 Idib., 112.
55 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 114.
56 Ibid., 112.
57 Ibid.
58 Takis S. Pappas, “Are Populist Leaders ‘Charismatic’? The Evidence from Europe,” Constellations: An International Journal of Critical & Democratic Theory 23 no. 3 (2016): 378, doi:10.1111/1467-8675.12233
59 Ibid., 380.
60 Ibid., 383
61 Ibid., 386.
62 George McKenna, American Populism (Capricorn Books, 1974), 87.
63 George McKenna, American Populism, 210.
64 Pappas, “Are Populist Leaders ‘Charismatic’?”, 380.
65 Ibid. 66 Ibid., 386.
67 George McKenna, American Populism, 87.
68 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 66.
69 Ibid., 71.
70 George McKenna, American Populism, 95. 71 Ibid.
72 George McKenna, “James B. Weaver: ‘A Call to Action’” American Populism., 95.
73 Ibid., 96.
74 Ibid., 110
75 Ibid., 112.
76 Ibid., 117.
77 Ibid., 116.
78 Bensel, The Political Economy, 252.
79 George McKenna, “People’s Party Platform: Restoring the ‘Plain People’” American Populism., 90.
80 Ibid., 94.
81 George McKenna, American Populism, 95.
82 Ibid., 222.
83 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 110.
84 George McKenna, American Populis., 222.
85 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 111.
86 Carter, The Politics of Rage, 335.
87 Ibid., 334. 88 Ibid., 337.
89 Ibid.
90 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 113.
91 Robert D. Wrinkle, and Jerry L. Polinard. “Populism And Dissent: The Wallace Vote in Texas,” Social Science Quarterly 54, no. 2 (1973): 309, http://www.jstor.org/stable/42859162.
92 Ibid., 319.
93 Carter, The Politics of Rage, 339
94 Ibid., 338.
95 George McKenna, American Populism, 221.
96 Ibid., 222.
97 Carter, The Politics of Rage, 334.
98 Ibid., 297.
99 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus. Third Parties In America, 111.
100 Carter, The Politics of Rage, 335.
101 Ibid., 339.
102 Ibid., 330
103 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, Third Parties In America, 114.
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